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Abstract 
This paper reconstructs the political history of the Syrian Arab Republic from the time of 
the country's emergence as an independent state in 1946 to the merger with Egypt to form 
the United Arab Republic in 1958. Two main sources of documentary evidence are brought 
to add to this analysis: firstly, declassified British government sources are utilized; 
secondly, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on arms 
exports to the Middle East is used to back up the descriptive analysis of Western strategic 
interests in the Middle East during the early Cold War period with some relevant 
quantitative data.  
 
From the beginning, Syria faced geopolitical challenges, which worked to undermine the 
country's political stability. Apart from intra-Arab conflicts and the issue of Zionist 
colonization in Palestine, Syria quickly developed into a focal point of the Cold War 
between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. This was due to the refusal of the 
United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) governments to support Syria's statehood in 
economic and military terms. The Western rejection of substantial assistance to Syria, 
largely motivated by efforts to back up Israel and fully unrelated to the question of whether 
or not Syria was governed by democratic or authoritarian rulers, explains the country’s 
shift toward the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s.  
 
Next, UK and US attempts to unseat Syrian governments through covert action (especially 
in 1949 and 1956-1957) are examined. It is shown that these events pushed Syria’s leaders 
to opt for merger with Nasser's Egypt and military assistance from the Soviet Union in 
order to avoid further destabilization. The paper concludes that Western failure to welcome 
Syria as an independent actor in the Middle East, which was due to the existence of 
previous strategic alignment with competing states in the region, opened the door for the 
Soviet Union to emerge as the long-term patron of the Syrian state. 
 
Keywords: 
Cold War; France; geopolitics; Middle East politics; Soviet Union; Syria; United Kingdom; 
United States of America   
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1. From the French Mandate to Syrian independence 
In 1916, the Entente powers Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement, named 
after a British politician and a French diplomat. This secret agreement provided for the 
division of the Levant region (also referred to as the Bilad al-Sham or historical 
administrative unit of Syria under the Ottomans) between the two powers in the event of a 
defeat of the Ottoman Empire. Following their victory in World War 1, Britain and France 
dismantled the Ottoman Empire. The Levant became divided into a southern British and a 
northern French zone of influence. This partition of the historical Bilad al-Sham produced 
four new territorial entities of Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The former two 
entities of Palestine and Jordan – now separated by a British imposed borderline along the 
Jordan River – were handed over to Britain as League of Nations Mandates. In turn, France 
received two League of Nations Mandates for Lebanon and Syria. In this context, the 
patronage of the League of Nations served mostly to cover up the fact that the four new 
Mandate entities were in reality controlled by British and French colonial administrators 
acting under the notion that the local population lacked in political maturity to allow for 
independent statehood.  
The French subsequently organized their rule in the northern Levant by parceling 
off ‘Greater Lebanon’ from the Bilad al-Sham. The ‘Greater Lebanon’ entity, put in place 
in 1922, came to contain the Maronite Christian areas – traditionally closely linked to 
France – but also incorporated Shia-settled territory to the south and Sunni and Druze-
settled regions to the east of Mount Lebanon. This redrafting created a numerical balance 
between different sects in the new state entity (Seale 2010: 117, 165-168). It also meant 
that what remained of Syria after the division was territorially much diminished in 
comparison to the Bilad al-Sham. Next, the French further subdivided Syria into smaller 
districts (or cantons) that were created in order to allow for privileged relationships with 
local ethnic and religious minorities. It was expected that the minorities would turn into 
loyal French proxies serving to impose an effective system of divide-and-rule in order to 
control the Sunni Muslim majority. In terms of military control, the French established the 
Troupes Spécials that were recruited from the minority populations of the Druze, 
Christians, Circassians, and Alawites. The majority population of Sunni Muslims was by 
contrast excluded from joining the French-controlled armed forces. After independence in 
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1946, the overrepresentation of minorities in the Syrian army leadership remained in place 
as an artefact of earlier French designs. 
This French concern with a balance of power between local forces – in the sense of 
making them control each other – explains the further subdivision of the Syrian Mandate 
into Alawite, Druze, Northern (Aleppo-centered), and Southern (Damascus-centered) 
‘states’ (Fildis 2011: 134-135). Efforts to permanently establish these entities failed, 
however. Instead, the French soon experienced a series of rebellions against their rule, 
most prominently the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925-1927, which originated in the Druze 
region and subsequently expanded to other parts of Syria before the French were able to 
repress it. Another conflict emerged due to the French decision to hand over the Sanjak of 
Alexandretta (the northern coastal area of the Syrian Mandate) to Turkey in 1938. 
Although this decision was illegal under League of Nations statutes, forbidding Mandate 
powers to cede territory to other states, it was imposed by the French in order to improve 
relations with Kemalist Turkey prior to World War 2. The cessation of Alexandretta 
subsequently forced a large share of the local Armenian and Arab population to flee to 
other regions of the Syrian Mandate.  
In the context of the contested Mandate, the last opportunity to peacefully resolve 
the conflict between the French authorities and the Syrian nationalist leaders could have 
been the ‘Franco-Syrian Treaty’ that was negotiated and signed in Paris on 9 September 
1936 under the French Popular Front government. The Treaty held that Syria would be 
granted full independence after a three-year probation period. It also provided for a twenty-
five-year agreement of friendship and alliance between France and Syria that included a 
French military mission, paid for by Syrian sources, to train the Syrian army after 
independence (Seale 2010: 342-350). However, Leon Blum’s Popular Front government 
lost office in June of 1937 and subsequent French governments refused to ratify the Treaty. 
As a result of this failure to reach a mutually agreed settlement to end the Mandate in a 
peaceful manner, relationships between France and Syrian nationalist leaders broke down, 
never to recover. In this context, it should be noted that US observers were already highly 
critical of French predominance in the Levant. Commenting on the Franco-Syrian Treaty, 
the US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, stated on 14 October 1936 the view of the US 
government: ‘We have no desire to urge the local governments to sign or conclude an 
agreement of any type with the French. We would even refuse to approve a treaty giving 
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discriminatory privileges to France or French nationals’ (Hull, quoted in Sachar 1973: 314, 
emphasis in the original). 
 The start of World War 2 dramatically weakened the French position in the Levant. 
Early in the conflict, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt put forward a concept for a future 
bilateral regional division of interests between Britain and the US in the Middle East, 
which excluded France as a regional stakeholder. He subsequently strengthened the US 
bargaining position in setting up the close alliance between the US administration and the 
Saudi King Ibn Saud, which was concluded at the end of WW2 and granted US oil 
companies exclusive access to the largest oil reserves in the Middle East. For US diplomats 
of the period, the agreement constituted ‘a stupendous source of strategic power, and one 
of the greatest material prizes in world history’ (Merriam, quoted in Gendzier 2011, 
footnote 3).  
The US President summed up his own thinking on the Greater Middle East in a 
statement to the British ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, as follows: ‘Persian oil 
is yours. We share the oil of Iraq and Kuwait. As for Saudi Arabian oil, it is ours’ 
(Roosevelt, quoted in Yergin, 1991: 40). In a similar vein, France played only a limited 
role in the planning process for the United Nations (UN) system that was expected to 
provide the framework of the post-WW2 political order. In this context, Roosevelt put 
forward his idea of the ‘Four Policemen’ suggesting that the US, Britain, the Soviet Union, 
and [nationalist] China should jointly provide geopolitical pillars of a future multilateral 
world order. Thus, his willingness to ignore French and especially Gaullist geopolitical 
claims was clearly visible to observers (Hoopes and Brinkley 1997: 100-101).  
For his part, Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French forces, was convinced 
that Britain secretly planned to take over the French stakes in the Levant region. He did not 
trust the assurances issued by the British Minister for the Middle East, Oliver Lyttelton, 
who stated in 1945 that ‘France should have the predominant position in Syria and the 
Lebanon over any other European Power’ (Lyttelton, quoted in Hourani 1946: 245). In 
reality, British projects to exclude France from the region were already in place; they 
aimed to link a British-guided partition of Palestine – in order to allow for the creation of 
the planned Jewish state – with schemes to create a Greater Syria based on the unification 
of Hashemite Jordan, French-administered Syria, the Arab remainder of Palestine, and 
Lebanon. Such British plans were frequently revised during the course of WW2. Over time, 
the traditional reliance on the British Hashemite clients in Jordan and Iraq was downgraded. 
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Instead, potential new alliances with Arab nationalist leaders in Lebanon and Syria as well 
as Egyptian and Saudi leaders were contemplated (Thomas 2000: 76-78, 83, 88).  
The British regional strategy was resented by de Gaulle who was keen to block any 
British gains at French expense and/or the emergence of an Anglo-American coalition 
against France in the region. In fact, de Gaulle continued to aspire to influence the 
economic, military, and cultural fields in Lebanon and Syria. His plans would have 
included military bases and the continuing French control of the Troupes Spécials – goals 
that were by then unacceptable to Arab and Syrian nationalist opinion.  
Thus, French attempts to restore control of Syria by military means after the 
conclusion of WW2 in Europe, such as the French bombardment of Damascus and other 
Syrian cities on 29 and 30 May 1945, only served to demonstrate France’s isolation in the 
face of local Syrian, regional Arab, and global public opinion. Since the French military 
campaign in Syria coincided with the San Francisco Conference, which took place from 
April to June of 1945 to set up the UN system, the Anglo-American leaders had to 
condemn French military unilateralism in strong terms. The British Prime Minister, 
Winston Churchill, demanded immediate French withdrawal ‘in order to avoid collision 
between British and French forces’ (Hoopes and Brinkley 1997: 201). Subsequently, 
British troops intervened in Syria on 1 June 1945 with the previous approval of US 
President Truman. This move once again highlighted French isolation and was soon 
followed by the British takeover of the local police force and British supply of light arms 
to the nascent Syrian and Lebanese armies.  
These actions, previously agreed with the US State Department (Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 16 February 1945: 1044-1046), were intended to prepare Syrian and 
Lebanese armed forces to take over after independence. At the same time, the French 
Troupes Spécials suffered large-scale desertions to the Syrian national government – an 
event recorded in Syrian nationalist historiography as the foundation of the independent 
Syrian army in 1945, which preceded the country’s political independence in 1946. In a 
last ditch effort, de Gaulle started to advocate for an international conference on the future 
of the Levant. He hoped to strengthen the French position by appealing to potential new 
regional stakeholders in the Middle East, such as the Soviet Union and nationalist China, in 
order to balance against the Anglo-American alliance (Melki 1997: 101). Not surprisingly, 
his idea to invite the Soviet Union to participate in negotiations about the future of the 
region was immediately rejected by the Anglo-American coalition. Moreover, Soviet 
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geopolitical objectives at this point in time – directly after the conclusion of WW2 and 
before the outbreak of early Cold War clashes – were mostly focused on the Turkish 
Straights, Azerbaijan, and northern Iran rather than the Levant (Thomas 2000: 84). Thus, 
de Gaulle ultimately failed in his efforts to maintain the French position in the Levant.  
Following the evacuation of the last French troops from Syria on 15 April 1946, the 
country became independent on 17 April. Overall, the balance sheet of the Mandate period 
was negative: the French had failed to penetrate Syrian society as the ‘Mandate from first 
to last was unwanted and resented by the native population themselves’ providing France 
‘with the barest minimum of prestige and even less material advantage’ (Sachar 1973: 
332). The French failure to maintain a bargaining position in Syria, let alone to establish a 
close relationship with the Syrian elites, was underlined after independence. The first 
President of independent Syria, Shukri Quwatli, quickly removed all traces of French 
influence in the Syrian education system and advanced a policy of linguistic Arabization. 
Moreover, the country withdrew from the franc currency bloc, thereby delinking the Syrian 
currency from French regional economic objectives (Sachar 1973: 331). Western 
diplomatic dispatches of the period frequently used the term ‘xenophobic’ to describe 
Quwatli’s government: the new regime acted in a nativist and inward-looking manner, and 
efforts to establish a treaty-based system of political relations between France and Syria 
were by now rejected by Syria’s leadership.  
In domestic politics, Quwatli’s government amounted to a conservative regime with 
a narrow social base derived from traditional notables and the landowning oligarchy. 
Because of this, the country’s regional alliances soon began to overlap with the personal 
and business relationships of Quwatli and focused in particular on the Saudi and Egyptian 
Kings. Crucially, the Syrian government took the initiative to invite the United States to 
send a military mission to train the armed forces of the newly independent country. This 
decision made Syria the first country in the Arab-speaking world to do so. However, the 
US rejected Syria’s request after careful deliberation since US alignment with Zionist 
objectives had already started to dominate US regional strategy at this time (Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 6 November 1945: 1209-1213).1  
                                                
1 One key statement, pointing to the US balancing act between different potential allies in the Middle 
East region, suggested that ‘if the United States should throw its full support to the Zionist program in 
Palestine, the resulting atmosphere in Syria would without doubt make the success of the mission an 
impossibility’ (ibid.: 1213, footnote omitted). Subsequent Syrian government requests for military 
missions from neutral Switzerland and Sweden were equally rejected. 
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At the time of independence, Syria no longer had any natural geopolitical patron 
and therefore became ‘the only country in the Arab-speaking world without some sort of 
Great Power prop’ (Melki 1997: 103-104). With the advantage of hindsight, it is clear that 
the failure to prepare an ‘imperial succession’ for Syria – due to the urgent Anglo-
American interest to remove France as a serious regional contender – had already set the 
stage for the country’s subsequent trajectory away from the Western geopolitical zone of 
influence. Moreover, the subsequent French decision to become the first military patron of 
Israel further confirmed to Syrian state and military elites that the country had to rely on its 
own resources. Thus, Syria’s policymaking during the Quwatli period became defined by a 
pragmatic neutralist position based on a proclaimed disinterest in the emerging agenda of 
the Cold War. While there were already some contacts with the Soviets and their proxies – 
such as a 1947 Czech arms deal that resulted in some small arms deliveries to the Syrian 
army – these contacts were not yet politically significant. In fact, Syria’s leadership did not 
adopt explicitly anti-Western policies until the mid-1950s.  
In conclusion, Anglo-American policymaking during the immediate post-
independence period failed to integrate Syria into a new regional security structure. The 
underlying reason for the absence of a coherent Syria policy was that the US already 
focused on alliances with Saudi Arabia and Israel while the UK was already committed to 
Syria’s Hashemite Arab neighbors Jordan and Iraq. By way of geopolitical accident, the 
French Mandate territory of Syria remained therefore outside of the regional structure of 
Anglo-American client states. The next section further analyzes Syria’s role in the context 
of the regional Arab and global geopolitical framework. 
 
 
2. The regional Arab state system after WW2 
The development of the Arab state system followed a different trajectory in comparison to 
the earlier emergence of powerful European states and the United States. While the 
European states and the US emerged over longer periods of time based on wars of 
conquest and the forced unification of smaller into larger state entities, this process was 
blocked in the Arab world due to Ottoman rule and the rising influence of European 
colonialism (Lustick 1997). Due to this dual system of domination, modern Arab 
nationalism emerged in a delayed fashion in the late 19th and early 20th century. It only 
took off as a political mass movement in reaction to the breakup of the Ottoman Empire 
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after WW1 and the Western powers subsequent imposition of their direct authority over 
the Arab world. In their effort to unite the Arabs, the nationalist leaders stressed that 
outsiders had controlled the Arab world through a strategy of ‘divide-and-rule’. In doing 
so, they were themselves in danger of overstating the case for ‘one indivisible Arab nation’ 
(the famous slogan advanced by the Baath Party founders Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din 
Bitar). In proclaiming the unity of the Arabs, the question of who belonged culturally and 
politically to this ‘nation’ and where the territorial boundaries of Arabism should be drawn 
was bound to emerge.2 
From the beginning, Arab nationalists faced the problem of how to develop an 
inclusive and comprehensive understanding of their own movement in its relationship with 
other sources of collective regional identity such as religion, sect, tribe, or linguistic and 
ethnic characteristics. Without further discussing these issues here, one needs to stress that 
outside interferences in the Arab world – such as the colonial imposition of boundaries by 
Britain and France in the Levant and on the Arab peninsula – remain a crucial explanatory 
factor for the comparative weakness of the Arabs as political actors in modern times. 
However, one should not overstate this element of outside interference, significant as it is, 
at the cost of neglecting the Arab elites own agency in maintaining internal divisions.  
Turning now to Syria’s situation after independence in 1946, the country emerged 
as part of a new post-WW2 regional Arab state system in the Levant and on the Arab 
peninsula. This system was characterized by the absence of a regional hegemon and 
consisted in the main of five states, namely the two branches of the British-backed 
Hashemite monarchies in Jordan and Iraq, the newly independent Lebanon and Syria, and 
Saudi Arabia. In addition, Egypt belonged to this system as an important ‘out-of-area’ 
neighboring state that differed from the five other states due to its long pre-modern history 
of independent statehood. Saudi Arabia was also a special case since it had been created in 
the 1920s by a war of conquest against the Jordan-based branch of the Hashemites uniting 
large shares of the Arab peninsula under the leadership of the Saud family. By contrast, the 
borders of the other four states had been drafted under the British and French Sykes-Picot 
Agreement of 1916 and its subsequent adaptations (Pursley 2015). These four entities were 
                                                
2 For example, the symbol of the Syrian Baath Party displays a map of the ‘Arab nation’ visualized in 
green color. This ‘nation’ reaches from Mauretania on the West African coast via all coastal Maghreb 
states toward the Arab peninsula and includes pre-division Sudan. This clearly raises questions about 
how Arab nationalism relates to other, potentially challenging nationalisms and group identities.  
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‘territorial’ or ‘state nations’ with rather shallow roots and differed fundamentally from the 
late 19th century European model of ethnic nationalism (Breuilly 1993).3  
It soon became apparent that the new Arab ‘state nations’ jointly faced a number of 
challenges. First, they were initially unable to act like modern states since they all lacked 
an effective domestic administrative and economic system. Second, they commanded only 
weak loyalty from citizens since state nationalism and the concept of citizenship had to 
compete with older and more established forms of belonging and collective identity at the 
level below and above the Arab state entities such as kinship, sect, religion, and tribe. 
Third, modern Arab nationalists frequently emphasized primary allegiance to pan-Arabism 
rather than loyalty to individual Arab states; indeed it has been stressed that ‘[t]he claim 
that the Arab state is a territorial state and not a nation state is based on the assumption that 
it is part of a wider Arab nation’ (Kienle 1990: 17).  
Yet despite these and other challenges, the regional system of Arab states proved to 
be remarkably stable in the second half of the 20th century. Fairly recently, it was still 
being suggested that ‘[f]or all its upheavals, the Middle East is a region of stable state 
entities’ (Halliday 2005: 75). In fact, this conundrum of weak Arab ‘state nations’ existing 
in a (relatively) stable regional state system requires further analysis. First of all, these 
contradictory features must be scrutinized in a critical manner in order to avoid 
oversimplification. On the one hand, Arab ‘state nations’ have over time acquired more 
features of modern statehood, although one might still question whether or not this has 
increased the stability of individual states. On the other hand, the regional Arab state 
system has never been stable in any endogenous manner. In fact, it would probably have 
suffered collapse without the regular intervention of Western powers and the Soviet Union 
policing the system from outside. Finally, and modernization notwithstanding, many Arab 
states continued to suffer from a narrow economic base and relied mostly on income from 
oil and other mineral wealth rather than domestic industrialization efforts. Thus, the Arab 
oil states became closely linked with the core OECD economies since a major share of 
their oil rent was reinvested in the economies of advanced countries or spent 
unproductively on arms and domestic national security states (Hinnebusch 2012).  
                                                
3 In fact, most postcolonial ‘state nations’ in Africa and Asia display characteristics of a ‘delayed’ or 
weak nationalism, and ethnic and sectarian divisions undermine state cohesion in Syria and the 
neighboring polities of Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. 
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As a consequence, the Arab state system quickly developed into one of the main 
sites of geopolitical competition between the two superpowers in the Cold War period 
(Hiro 1982: ch. 12-13). When Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt started to challenge the status 
quo in the Arab world from the mid-1950s onwards, the Western powers immediately 
engaged in counter interventions to stop him. It was only the British military operation in 
Jordan against indigenous Jordanian supporters of Nasser in 1957 and the military 
intervention of the US in Lebanon against local Nasserists in 1958 that defended the rule of 
the Jordanian King and the then pro-American Lebanese President, respectively (Hiro 
1982: 319-320; Blackwell 2009: 187). In summary, the survival of the deeply fragmented 
and weak states of Jordan and Lebanon was to a large extent due to the interference of the 
Western powers in their domestic affairs. This must be understood as part of a broader 
Western interest in maintaining the imposed colonial borders and territorial states in the 
region (Maninger 2013: 302, 306).  
Moreover, regional factors are equally significant to explain the survival of the 
Arab state system, and alliances and conflicts between such states must be interpreted in 
terms of the search for ‘anti-hegemonic equilibria within this system’ (Kienle 1990: 27). 
However, such efforts to counterbalance against challenges to the regional status quo 
tended to bring in external actors, which in turn made it more difficult to reestablish the 
regional balance.4 In the end, nearly all of the intra-Arab challenges to the regional status 
quo failed, since hidden warfare and the clandestine funding of local proxies could not 
make up for the lack of a strong local support base (Rathmell 1995: ch. 6). No Arab 
country succeeded in efforts to permanently take over another one. Thus, Nasser’s project 
of union between Egypt and Syria, as implemented during the United Arab Republic 
between 1958 and 1961, was only possible due to fear on the part of Syrian actors in the 
Baath Party and elsewhere to fall victim to domestic challenges from a US-backed right-
wing coup in Syria in line with similar US and UK interventions in neighboring Jordan 
(Brown 2013: 21-23; Little 1990). Yet the United Arab Republic also broke up when it 
became apparent to Syrian policymakers that the country’s political life had simply been 
                                                
4 Some important events cannot be explained by intra-Arab competition or Western intervention but 
were due to domestic factors. In particular, the Iraqi revolution of 1958 was domestically-driven, 
produced the full-scale destruction of the British-backed Hashemite regime, and challenged the 
structural power of Western states in the Arab world. The Iraqi events were certainly more dramatic in 
comparison to the step-by-step decline of the Western powers’ influence in Syria between 1946 and 
1956.  
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taken over by Egyptian administrators, thereby disenfranchising all Syrian actors 
independent from their political affiliation. In the end, Nasser’s short-term success in 
challenging the status quo could not be sustained. 
In conclusion, the Nasserist and Baathist variations of Arab nationalism ultimately 
failed to act as effective unifying forces in the Arab world. While this defeat was to some 
extent due to outside interventions into Arab affairs, the main reason was that the regional 
Arab state system, imposed by the Western colonial powers, divided even the most 
committed Arab nationalists into factions that competed with each other. Thus, Arab 
nationalism became intimately linked with existing territorial Arab states and depended for 
political survival on the effective control of material and ideological resources that only 
states could provide (Chaitani 2007: 164; Kienle 1990: 50). This is not to deny Arab 
nationalism a significant historical role; rather one needs to account for the fact that the 
abstract commitment to ‘unity of the Arab nation’ proceeded in practice alongside the 
reinforcement of the existing Arab state system (Owen 1992: 85, 89). In the next section, 
Syria’s political development from independence in 1946 to the rise of Nasserist and 
Soviet influence in 1956 is discussed, focusing in turn on global, regional Arab, and local 
Syrian factors and how they influenced the course of events. 
 
3. From independence to the rise of Nasserism & Soviet influence (1946-1956) 
When Syria became independent in 1946, the country’s new leadership could not imagine 
how geopolitical factors associated with the Cold War, the challenge of Zionism, and intra-
Arab conflicts would all contribute to the country’s political instability and weak 
statehood. In fact, there was hardly any time to learn new lessons in the short period 
between 1946 and 1949, when the military coup of Colonel Husni Zaim, the chief of staff 
of the Syrian army, ended constitutional government in Syria. From the very start, 
independent Syria was forced to confront major challenges. In 1947 and 1948, the failure 
of the combined Arab armies to prevent the expulsion of Arabs from Palestine resulted in 
the establishment of Israel in 1948. This traumatic experience of defeat, shared by all 
Arabs, and the subsequent failure to effectively coordinate the Arab states’ regional 
response to Zionism triggered new demands for Arab unity in general and the immediate 
merger of Arab states in particular.  
For many Syrians, it was therefore unclear whether Syrian statehood would be 
anything more than a transitional stage toward some larger Arab (or at least larger Syrian) 
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polity. At this point in time, reference to the Bilad al-Sham of Ottoman times was still a 
natural way of considering regional politics and the loss of Syrian territory during the 
French Mandate (the French decision to hand over the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey in 
1938) was still a recent event. Moreover, the separation of Syria from the Lebanese ports 
and trade routes, due to Lebanese independence in 1943, appeared to many Syrian actors as 
another artificial imposition deriving from the illegitimate French Mandate (Seale 2010: 
612-614). In sum, the unclear geographical identity of Syria amounted to a significant 
foundational burden and questioned the country’s economic and political viability.  
Additional domestic challenges derived from the underdeveloped political system 
and the shallow roots of Syria’s statehood in society. In particular, the new Syrian 
government under the Presidency of Shukri Quwatli was little more than a club of the 
traditional economic elites representing the large landowners and Sunni trading 
bourgeoisie of Damascus and, to a lesser extent, Aleppo. In this context, the two-party 
system at the time of independence consisted of the Damascus-based National Party 
(Quwatli’s party) and the Aleppo-based People’s Party (in English-language sources also 
referred to as Popular or Populist Party). In fact, both of these parties were neither 
connected with popular sectors nor based on political programs beyond loyalty to 
traditional leaders and influential families. 
As a result of Syria’s weak national identity, shallow statehood, and 
underdeveloped political system, neighboring Arab states were keen to put forward ‘Arab 
unity’ schemes serving their own objectives. In fact, each of these schemes would have 
resulted in the takeover of Syria by another Arab state. The two most likely scenarios at 
that time were the so-called ‘Greater Syria’ scheme (unification of Syria with Jordan under 
the King representing one branch of the Hashemite family) or, alternatively, the so-called 
‘Fertile Crescent’ scheme (unification of Syria with Iraq which was at the time notionally 
governed by a regent acting for another branch of the Hashemite family, but was 
essentially controlled by British advisors). In order to avoid these two possible unity 
schemes at the cost of Syrian statehood, Quwatli relied on his good personal relationship 
with the Saudi King who had conquered his Kingdom from the Hashemites in the 1920s 
and was therefore willing to back up Syrian independence in order to avoid a strengthening 
of Hashemite regional influence. 
Yet, the survival of the Syrian state as an independent entity was at this early stage 
still open to questioning. Rather than being influential in its own right, Syria essentially 
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gained regional influence as a ‘swing state’ by backing up the hegemonic ambitions of one 
of the more powerful Arab countries, namely Egypt, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia (Yaqub 2004: 
36). In short, Syria was too strong to be ignored in competition for regional hegemony and 
too weak to be a credible contender for regional leadership in its own right.  
In order to look more systematically at Syria’s position after independence, the 
current section adopts a three-level analysis focusing in turn on domestic, regional, and 
global factors. In fact, the interrelationship between the three levels is crucial to explain the 
Syrian case in a convincing manner. To begin with, one must consider Syria’s ‘long year’ 
(1949) in which three military coups highlighted the country’s weak statehood and 
vulnerability to internal and external power contests. Patrick Seale’s classic account of 
early Syrian statehood, the monograph The Struggle for Syria (1965), not bypassed by 
latter-day scholarship, can by now be backed up by the ‘official-unofficial record’ (Dan 
Atkinson) of secret diplomatic dispatches of the Western powers, especially the British 
records on Syria that have been published in the mid-2000s (Records of Syria 2005).5 
To recapitulate the generally known facts, Syrian society experienced in the late 
1940s and early 1950s the rise of new popular parties such as the Arab Socialist Baath 
Party, the Syrian Communist Party (SCP), and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP). 
This emergence of new ‘ideological’ parties took place in parallel with the rise in 
significance of the domestic political role of the Syrian army and especially the army’s 
officer corps as a new alternative power center. Both of these developments opened new 
channels for the social advancement of lower socioeconomic groups at the expense of the 
traditional Syrian elites. In this context, it is significant to note that the Syrian army, as the 
new core institution to back up domestic political power, diverged from the other Arab 
armies of the late 1940s and early 1950s. This was due to the absence of a ‘natural’ 
geopolitical patron that could have linked the armed forces with external sponsorship and 
patronage.  
On the one hand, the three potentially relevant Western powers, the US, the UK, 
and France were aware that effective coordination of their respective policies on Syria 
would have added to their bargaining power in dealings with Syrian actors such as the 
                                                
5 The current paper takes account of the opening of the British sources as far as they were published in 
the 2005 collection (this resource appears to have been underutilized since its publication). As for US 
sources, CIA files are usually declassified after a delay of fifty years or more. This process appears to 
offer some assurance about the ultimate transparency of US covert actions. However, declassified CIA 
material is subjected to extensive censoring, which questions its value for academic research. 
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army. On the other hand, the three powers were equally anxious not to grant each other 
undue favors in terms of intervening in Syrian affairs. What united them was little more 
than a diffuse dislike of what a British diplomat of the time termed the Quwatli 
administration’s ‘cult of independence and isolation’ (Records of Syria 2005, Vol. 10: 
173). Thus, the three Western powers proved unable to act in a unified manner as will be 
discussed below. 
The story of Western power politics in Syria starts off with US concern over the 
slow and hesitant manner in which Syria’s President and the Syrian Parliament dealt with 
US demands to grant right of way for the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline). This pipeline 
was constructed between 1947 and 1949 on behalf of the US-owned Arabian-American Oil 
Company (Aramco). At this time, Tapline was the most important US pipeline project in 
the Arab region and expected to deliver oil from Qaisuimah in Saudi Arabia to the port city 
of Sidon in Lebanon. It was significant in the context of US oil interests in Saudi Arabia 
and of strategic value for supplying oil to US allies in postwar Western Europe. Due to the 
founding of Israel in 1948, the original plan to have the pipeline end in the Palestinian port 
of Haifa was abandoned. Instead, a new revised Tapline route was scheduled to first cross 
Jordan and then the Syrian Golan Heights to end in the port city of Sidon in Lebanon. 
In the scholarly literature, there is agreement that ‘[t]he structure of the U.S. 
petroleum industry played a key role in determining the content and conduct of foreign oil 
policy’ and that ‘[c]orporate power molded both policy objectives and outcomes’ (Painter, 
quoted in Vitalis 2002, footnote 14). There is, however, no agreement about the exact line 
of causality in terms of whether ‘business privilege’ (Anderson, quoted in Vitalis 2002, 
footnote 14) dominated the conduct of US foreign policy or, alternatively, US 
policymaking converted oil companies into informal instruments of US diplomacy. What is 
certainly true is that covert action by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), then newly 
founded, quickly became the instrument of choice to advance US political and economic 
interests in the region.  
In the Syrian case, US support for the first coup of Husni Zaim in 1949 is beyond 
reasonable doubt, although the actual extent of CIA involvement has never been fully 
established since the relevant CIA files remain closed. The most convincing version of 
events, based on available open sources, suggests that local CIA agents and the local US 
military attaché acted independently from official endorsement by the State Department to 
maintain plausible deniability in their efforts to encourage Zaim to dispose of President 
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Quwatli (Copeland 1970: 50-53; Rathmell 1995: ch. 2; Curtis 2011; Moubayed 2012: 77-
81). This effort was to a large extent driven by considerations related to the Tapline project. 
However, any balanced account of the history of the three Syrian military coups in 1949 
must take account of the fact that the intervention of the Syrian military in domestic 
politics was motivated by mutually overlapping local, regional, and global factors. With 
the possible exception of Zaim’s US-backed first coup, the local Syrian and regional Arab 
factors proved to be more important than foreign intervention.  
At the domestic level, the reputation of the Syrian army had been damaged by its 
weak performance during the war in Palestine in 1948. Restoring the army’s credibility 
clashed, however, with Quwatli’s post-war suggestion to shift Syria from a professional 
army toward a militia system. This move would have questioned the power of the officer 
corps and was therefore rejected in military circles. In addition, Quwatli had failed to 
provide the army with more advanced weaponry, and the military expected that regime 
change toward military rule would allow a process of catching up with the strength of 
some of the other armies in the region.  
At the regional level, Syria’s difficult relationship with the two branches of the 
Hashemite dynasty in Jordan and Iraq, already referred to above, was also highly 
significant to explain the events of 1949. The scenario of unification with Jordan (‘Greater 
Syria’) or Iraq (‘Fertile Crescent’) was certainly attractive to some factions in the Syrian 
military. On the other hand, the Saudi King as Quwatli’s closest regional ally was 
concerned with a potential Hashemite-controlled land bridge between the Mediterranean 
and the Persian Gulf as an effort to seal off Saudi Arabia from the rest of the Arab world. 
He was therefore willing to back those factions in the Syrian army that were anti-
Hashemite (Seale 1965: 47). The anti-Hashemite cause was also supported by France, 
which at this time still acted as the major supplier of the Syrian army. As a result, different 
Syrian army factions kept each other in check and no faction managed to gain any decisive 
advantage. Thus, all three coups of 1949 ultimately failed to realign Syria with any of the 
neighboring Arab states.  
Finally, global factors were also significant to explain the breakdown of 
constitutional government in Syria. The Western powers were certainly interested to limit 
the decision-making autonomy of nationalist Arab governments such as the one in Syria. 
To begin with, the US, UK, and France did share economic interests in the Arab world 
such as shared ownership of the Iraq Petroleum Company. They wanted to run the oil 
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sector in a way that did not allow local Arab states to exercise much countervailing 
influence. 6  The Western powers also shared political interests with regard to the 
construction of a regional defense organization in order to line up the Arab states against 
potential Soviet advances in the region. However, the expansion of US economic and 
political power and parallel decline of British and French positions in the Arab world 
triggered controversy among the Western powers: they each wished their own regional 
clients to exercise leadership in a regional Arab defense alliance. Thus, British efforts to 
advance the role of its Hashemite clients in Iraq clashed with American efforts to push for 
the regional leadership of Saudi Arabia (Gorst and Lucas 1989: 583, 593). In this context 
of preexisting Anglo-American alliances with local clients, Syria continued to be unaligned 
and was therefore forced to deal with contradictory and frequently changing Western 
objectives.  
The US emerged in this situation as the new regional hegemon in the Middle East 
and the country’s newly acquired power was exercised in a rather experimental manner by 
bodies such as the CIA. For example, the CIA’s encouragement and very likely direct 
support of Colonel Zaim’s 1949 coup was at least partially motivated by efforts to speed 
up Syria’s agreement to the construction of the Tapline pipeline across Syrian territory. 
Another significant factor was the apparent willingness of Zaim to sign an armistice 
agreement with Israel and to accept the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in 
Syria (Rathmell 1995: 38). Thus, US interests were advanced without much concern for 
local Syrian conditions: removing the conservative and Saudi-linked Quwatli and replacing 
him with a military man seemed to offer an easy and convenient way of speeding up Syrian 
approval of US objectives such as the Tapline pipeline concession. 
Directly after Zaim’s coup, this strategy appeared to work well. The new military 
regime quickly moved to adjust Syria’s government policy in line with Western and 
especially US objectives. Zaim started a domestic anti-communist campaign; withdrew all 
Syrian claims against Turkey over the Sanjak of Alexandretta; signed a Syrian-Israeli 
armistice formally ending the 1948 Palestine war; expressed in conversation with the US 
minister in Damascus a willingness to accept Palestinian refugees for resettlement in Syria; 
                                                
6 At the beginning of the 1950s, share ownership of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) was distributed 
fairly equally between American, British, and French oil interests (Wikipedia, no date). The IPC relied 
on a pipeline running between Kirkuk in the Kurdish region of Iraq and the Syrian port of Banias. 
Syrian policymakers frequently challenged the IPC and demanded higher revenue shares in exchange 
for the right-of-way of the IPC pipeline. 
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and approved the long-delayed Tapline concession on 16 May 1949, thereby satisfying the 
commercial interests of the US oil company Aramco (Little 1990a: 57; Rathmell 1995: 37-
39). At the same time, Zaim’s regime also improved relations with France in order to gain 
access to more French military assistance (Rathmell 1995: 34-35; Whitman 2011: 21-22).  
In terms of his regional policy, Zaim focused on continuing Quwatli’s course of 
close relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt to ensure regional backing for his rule and to 
fend off Hashemite claims on Syria. There were also some efforts to construct a domestic 
support base beyond military circles when Zaim briefly linked up with the leftist Arab 
Socialist Party of Akram Hawrani. In summary, Zaim was determined to satisfy highly 
relevant local, regional, and international constituencies, which appeared to turn him into a 
serious contender for a stable authoritarian regime backed by the Western powers. 
Nevertheless, Zaim’s regime lasted only 137 days and ended with his downfall and 
execution on 14 August 1949.  
The ultimate reason for Zaim’s failure was that his domestic political power base 
remained weak. His erratic personality, perceived as megalomania by some observers, 
irritated potential Western sponsors of his rule and his decision to assume the title of 
Marshall offended his fellow officers. Equally important, Zaim had made many enemies 
among the traditional Syrian elite, in Islamic religious circles, and among the followers of 
the SSNP. In particular, his decision to hand over Antun Saadeh, the founder and leader of 
the SSNP, to the Lebanese authorities for the latter’s alleged role in an earlier SSNP revolt 
in Lebanon resulted on 8 July 1949 in Saadeh’s execution in Beirut. Thus, Zaim’s role in 
facilitating Saadeh’s execution turned him into a prime target for retaliation by the SSNP 
(Rathmell 1995: 46-50). In summary, Zaim offended a critical mass of domestic opponents, 
thereby uniting them to push for his disposal.  
The direct trigger for Zaim’s downfall was his plan to move army units to the Jabal 
Druze (the area to the south of Damascus in which the Druze make up the large majority of 
inhabitants) to break up the considerable degree of local autonomy of the Druze tribal 
leaders – an objective that his predecessor Quwatli had earlier failed to achieve (Seale 
1965: 74-75; Rathmell 1995: 51; Landis 1998). However, Zaim’s threat of a campaign 
against the Druze was only the final step to motivate a group of officers led by Colonel 
Sami Hinnawi, commander of the First Brigade, to dispose of Zaim. 
The second Syrian military regime of 1949, now chaired by Hinnawi, was backed 
by a set of SSNP-influenced officers such as Colonel Adib Shishakli, Akram Hawrani’s 
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Arab Socialist Party, the Aleppo-based People’s Party, and pro-Hashemite Druze leaders. 
In contrast to Zaim, Hinnawi stressed that he intended to restore a constitutional regime 
and elections were duly held on 14 August 1949 producing a victory of the Aleppo-based 
and pro-Iraqi People’s Party. However, the solid majority of the People’s Party in 
Parliament proved insufficient to allow Hinnawi to realize his objective of union with 
Hashemite Iraq. After announcing People’s Party plans for union between Syria and Iraq at 
the beginning of December, another officer group in the Syrian army led by Colonel 
Shishakli forced Hinnawi on 19 December 1949 to hand over power. In what amounted to 
the third Syrian military coup in nine months, Shishakli proclaimed that he intended to 
preserve Syrian independence and the autonomy of the Syrian army, which would have 
been lost in the event of an Iraqi takeover. In line with the blueprint of Zaim’s earlier bid 
for power, the Shishakli-led regime enjoyed CIA support (Weiner 2008: 149) and moved 
quickly to restore Syria’s privileged regional links with Saudi Arabia and Egypt whilst 
distancing the country from Hashemite Iraq.  
Although Shishakli initially stressed his willingness to restore a constitutional 
regime, the period following his coup continued to be characterized by political instability. 
From the beginning of 1950 to the end of 1951, seven revolving door civilian governments 
were formed alternating in turn between National Party and People’s Party cabinets. In 
reaction to this weakness of the two traditional nationalist parties and the civilian 
politicians, Shishakli once again decided to dissolve Parliament in order to establish a 
personal dictatorship. This second dictatorship lasted in turn from the end of 1951 until 25 
February 1954, when another military coup forced him out.  
In the period following his second coup, Shishakli frequently expressed his goal to 
acquire substantial military assistance from the Western powers. Similar to Zaim’s earlier 
plans, Shishakli aimed to attract patronage by renewing Syria’s concession for Tapline and 
by offering to settle Palestinian refugees in Syria. However, Shishakli’s hope to exchange 
such accommodating policies against substantial Western (and especially US) military and 
economic assistance were vetoed in meetings of the Israeli Ambassador in Washington, 
Abba Eban, with US Secretary of State Dean Acheson. According to the Israeli 
Ambassador, military assistance to Syria amounted to a direct threat to Israel. This Israeli 
intervention proved to be successful with US policymakers while parallel efforts of Syrian 
representatives to argue their case were ignored by Washington (Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 5 January 1953: 1088-1093, and ibid., 6 January 1953: 1093-1094). 
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In conclusion, the major external reason for the failure of each of the three Syrian 
dictators to establish a strong regime was that the US, UK, and France all refused to grant 
substantial military and economic assistance. This collective Western rejection of 
assistance was not due to concern for constitutional government in Syria. Indeed, Syria’s 
more or less constitutional governments between 1946-1949, 1950-1951, 1954-1958, and 
1961-1963 were also excluded from economic and military assistance. Rather, the three 
Western powers were already committed to other regional allies in the direct neighborhood 
of Syria. These pre-existing regional alliances appeared to offer more significant 
geopolitical returns in comparison with a substantially expanded engagement in Syria. This 
concerned the US alliances with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the UK’s link with Iraq and 
Jordan, and the French concerns in Lebanon. Equally significant, the Western powers were 
also closely linked with Israel. Thus, from their geopolitical point of view, Syria appeared 
to be more trouble than it was worth: any new commitments in Syria were bound to 
increase costs elsewhere and would have raised concerns among the already existing allies 
and clients. 
The difficulty of the Western position is illustrated in an exemplary manner when 
looking at an extensive British strategic debate on Syria that took place among senior 
British foreign policy circles in secret memoranda over the duration of the year 1952, i.e. 
during the first year of General Shishakli’s second dictatorship (Records of Syria 2005, 
Vol. 11: 69-106). According to some of the British observers, the Shishakli regime offered 
at this point good prospects for a stable and potentially pro-Western authoritarian regime in 
Damascus. The strategic problem for the UK was whether or not Syria should be upgraded 
to the status of a serious British ally. This would have implied to offer Shishakli’s regime 
substantial degrees of military assistance. There were two points of view. On the one hand, 
it was argued that a more serious engagement with Shishakli was the only way forward to 
advance British interests. According to the British minister in Damascus, these interests 
focused on three concerns, namely (1) to add Syria to a Western defense alliance in the 
Arab region; (2) to make Syria accept responsibility for a share of the Palestinian refugees 
that had fled Palestine at the time of the constitution of the Zionist state; and (3) to protect 
the Western powers’ joint oil interests as represented by the Iraq Petroleum Company 
(IPC) pipeline that crossed Syrian territory (Records of Syria 2005, Vol. 11: 73).  
The British officials in favor of engaging Shishakli referred to the country as an 
‘ultra nationalist’ state but argued that ‘it may be necessary to supply arms to such States in 
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order to ensure that we have some hope that they will pursue the policies which we 
approve (…) [T]his may be particularly the case in Syria’ (Records of Syria 2005, Vol. 11: 
76). In a similar vein, it was argued that ‘confidence will only be gained when the Syrian 
officer feels that the Western Powers regard him as something more than a policeman’ 
(Records of Syria 2005, Vol. 11: 90). The same diplomat also stressed that ‘I have now 
reached a point at which I can make no headway here unless I can show (…) that we are 
interested in building up the Syrian army (…)’ (Records of Syria 2005, Vol. 11: 73). He 
then hammered home the point that we [i.e. the UK] ‘are not giving him [Shishakli] 
anything that he really wants’ and ‘before we can set Colonel Shishakli trotting towards the 
West both the stick and the carrot mist [sic] be applied’ (Records of Syria 2005, Vol. 11: 
96-97).  
Other British officials dismissed these points, however. They argued that British 
military assistance for Syria would offer no guaranteed benefits of any kind but was sure to 
offend Britain’s Hashemite Iraqi ally and might trigger security problems for Israel. It was 
suggested that ‘it may sometimes be justified to use a sprat in the form of some armament 
tidbit to catch a mackerel in the form of political influence to support our Middle East 
defence planning. But one needs to be sure that one is buying something more than the 
uncertain support of a transitory regime (…) grave doubts arise as to its expediency from 
our point of view’ (Records of Syria 2005, Vol. 11: 78). In the end, this British strategic 
debate on Syria produced no practical results. It appears that there was always some 
element missing in terms of motivating British policymakers sufficiently. Either the 
Shishakli regime was judged to be too weak domestically to be worth a serious effort to 
gain its favor or, alternatively, the British position of taking advantage of the very 
weakness of the Syrian state to push for ‘unity’ with Iraq under some British-backed 
security umbrella was considered to be too difficult to achieve.7  
 
 
                                                
7 The only practical result of the British charm offensive to woo Shishakli was the delivery of two 
‘Meteor’ trainer aircrafts to the Syrian air force in 1952. Another diplomatic dispatch states in this 
context that ‘I am not looking forward to the day he [Shishakli] finds out that the Israelis too are 
getting Meteors’ (Records of Syria 2005, Vol. 11: 105-106). More British jets were only delivered to 
Syria when the Shishakli regime was already on the way out. 
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4. Western covert action against Syria (1955-1957): How repeated efforts to unseat 
the Syrian government pushed the country toward the Soviet Union 
The last section discussed the hesitation of the Western powers to offer military and 
economic assistance to Syria during the Shishakli period. After 1954, however, the 
Western powers changed course with regard to their respective interventions in Syrian 
affairs. Beforehand, their attitude had been characterized by hesitation while it now turned 
to intense activities. In order to explain this major shift from Western neglect of Syria 
toward all-out efforts to unseat the Syrian governments in 1956 and 1957 by means of at 
least three Western-sponsored coup attempts and various sideline plots that included Arab 
proxies and Turkey, one must first of all take account of the changing regional strategic 
environment. Most crucially, the Western powers started to realize in 1954 and 1955 that 
Nasser’s leadership of Egypt had the potential to fundamentally transform the strategic 
calculus of Arab politics, thereby endangering their regional control.  
Initially, the British had hoped that Nasser would be willing to join a regional Arab 
defense alliance against the Soviet Union that was supposed to include the close British 
allies Jordan and Iraq as well as Syria. The Americans, in turn, were more interested to 
form a ‘Northern Tier’’ alliance of states bordering the Soviet Union focusing on Pakistan 
and Turkey.8 At this point, US strategists still assumed that close personal relationships 
between Middle Eastern CIA operatives and Nasser, established before the Egyptian 
revolution, would allow them to exercise guidance over his policies. For his part, Nasser 
was keen to encourage such American assumptions since he expected to gain more leeway 
in his dealings with the British in turn (Little 2004: 678). In the event, Nasser first rejected 
the British-led regional defense alliance and then pushed Britain to negotiate a step-by-step 
withdrawal of UK troops from the Suez zone. For this purpose, Nasser signed a treaty with 
Britain on 19 October 1954 that set a time table for the withdrawal of the British garrison 
from their Suez Base by June 1956.  
From the UK’s point of view, the new Egyptian policies directly challenged the 
British position in the Middle East. They triggered a strategic shift of British policymakers 
                                                
8 In February 1955, Iraq and Turkey signed a ‘pact of mutual cooperation’ (the ‘Baghdad Pact’). Later 
in the year, Britain, Pakistan and Iran also declared their adherence to the pact. The United States 
signed mutual agreements with each of the member states without formally joining the Pact. The King 
of Jordan was unable to sign the Pact due to domestic opposition. However, the Iraqi revolution of 
1958 resulted in the country’s withdrawal from the Pact and neither British nor American strategic 
objectives were ultimately achieved.  
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toward increased reliance on Iraq in order to protect access to the region’s oil supplies and 
pipelines. In this context, Syria gained urgent strategic significance ‘not because of any 
intrinsic value, but because of Britain’s attempt to preserve the Iraqi-Jordan axis embodied 
in the Baghdad Pact’ (Pearson 2007: 46) that had been founded in February 1955. Since 
Egypt had earlier rejected the Baghdad Pact and had subsequently sponsored, jointly with 
Saudi Arabia, an Arab counter alliance that was competing for political influence in Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria, the British-led alliance seemed to be under threat. Moreover, the 
success of left-wing and Arab nationalist parties in Syrian elections in 1954 and 1955 
appeared to increase Egyptian (and by extension possibly Soviet) influence in Syria. All 
these developments questioned the safety of the IPC pipeline that crossed Syrian territory 
and was absolutely crucial for British transfer of Iraqi oil to Western Europe. The British 
fear of Syria to ‘gravitate towards the Egyptian rather than the Iraqi orbit’ (Records of 
Syria 2005, Vol. 11: 476) increased further when the new Syrian government of Prime 
Minister Sabri al-Asali finally rejected Syrian membership in the Baghdad Pact on 22 
February (Gorst and Lucas 1989: 578). At this time, British strategists started to seriously 
consider Iraqi plans to push for a ‘Fertile Crescent’ union of Iraq, Syria and Jordan, which 
would have secured British regional influence but depended on regime change in Syria in 
order to become a realistic proposition (Pearson 2007: 46).  
In the meantime, and inconvenient from the British point of view, Quwatli was 
once again elected Syrian President. In his first post-election statement in September 1955, 
he promised to provide the Syrian army with modern equipment and to push for an alliance 
between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia to oppose British plans (Records of Syria 2005, 
Vol. 11: 559). Nasser’s signing of an arms deal with the Soviet Bloc (the so-called ‘Czech 
arms deal’) on 27 September 1955 and the announcement of similar aspirations by Syrian 
politicians further intensified British concerns. By October 1955, British and American 
regional strategists began to converge on the view that the Syrian government should be 
forced out. Nevertheless, there was still tactical disagreement concerning the role of Iraq in 
a Western takeover of Syrian politics. The US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was 
particularly keen to avoid the appearance of a direct takeover of Syria by Iraq, although he 
acknowledged in conversation with his British counterpart Macmillan that ‘Syria was the 
nearest thing in the Middle East to a Soviet satellite’ (quoted in Gorst and Lucas 1989: 
582). Another British memorandum, issued by the Permanent Under-Secretary of the 
Foreign Office on 31 October, stated with confidence that ‘[i]n the event that Syria falls 
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under Soviet domination or seems likely to do so, we should encourage the liquidation of 
the country and its incorporation into Iraq’ (Kirkpatrick, quoted in Gorst and Lucas 1989: 
582).  
The two Western powers now started to coordinate their efforts to deal with the 
Egyptian and Syrian challenges. The general framework for joint action was ‘Project 
Omega’ that amounted to ‘a secret blueprint for combating revolutionary nationalism 
throughout the Arab world’ (Little 2004: 675). President Eisenhower’s approval of the 
Omega project on 28 March 1956 overlapped with the joint preparation, by British and 
American intelligence agencies, for a coup in Syria, termed ‘Operation Straggle’. 
Preparation of the coup was considered to be of the highest priority due to parallel 
developments in Egypt. Here, Nasser reacted to the withdrawal of British and American 
funding promises for the Aswan Dam with the decision to nationalize the British and 
French controlled Suez Canal Company on 26 July. This decision started the escalation 
toward the Suez Crisis which resulted in the Israeli and subsequent joint Franco-British 
invasion of Egypt on 29 October. The background of the escalation of the Egyptian crisis 
explains why the Western planners were keen to force out the Syrian government in order 
to limit Nasser’s ability to project his leadership across the Arab world. 
In order to summarize subsequent Western covert action against the Syrian 
government between 1956 and 1957, one needs to first of all acknowledge that many 
sources are still closed for research. The secrecy surrounding the operations continues to 
constrict the historiography of this crucial period of Syrian history.9 Thus, explaining how 
Syria was pushed toward the Soviet Union during this period requires reconstructing the 
various Western plots and subplots implemented between 1956 and 1957 in their entirety. 
The historiography suggests that three main covert operations took place out of which two 
were joint Anglo-American. These were in temporal order (1) ‘Operation Straggle’, a joint 
British and American operation that took place between March and October 1956 and 
ended in the uncovering of the plot by Syrian intelligence; (2) ‘Operation Wappen’, the 
                                                
9 For example, a recent handbook of Middle Eastern intelligence covers only two of arguably at least 
five Western covert operations against the Syrian government in 1956 and 1957 (Kahana and Suwaed 
2009: 246-248). Another recent account of American interventionism against nationalist governments 
in developing countries fails to mention CIA efforts to unseat Syrian governments (Sullivan III 2008). 
Finally, a recent monograph on CIA history provides only a sketchy summary of US contacts with 
Shishakli and fails to adequately sum up the existing literature.. In particular, the CIA operations in 
1956 and 1957 are explained in a manner that does not allow readers to understand the geopolitical 
objectives motivating the agency (Weiner 2008: 159-161).  
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CIA’s unilateral effort to recruit right-wing dissidents inside of the Syrian army for a coup 
that would bring back Shishakli as dictator of Syria that was in turn uncovered by Syrian 
intelligence on 12 August 1957; (3) the ‘Preferred Plan’, another combined effort of the 
two Western powers that was put forward in September 1957 in order to promote unrest 
within Syria to be followed by armed incursions from neighboring countries and the 
assassination of Syrian key political and military figures that had stopped the two earlier 
coup attempts. In addition, the US engaged in efforts to encourage Turkey to invade Syria 
after August 1957 while the UK aimed for a Jordanian and/or Iraqi attack on Syria to force 
through British plans for Syria’s membership in  the Baghdad Pact.  
If there was any common denominator explaining these covert operations, it 
amounted to British and American willingness to pursue ‘trial-and-error’ tactics in the 
hope that a weak spot in Syrian defense efforts could be found. In turn, Syria’s defense 
against Western covert action, and parallel efforts of Nasser and the Syrians to exercise 
countervailing influence in neighboring Jordan and Lebanon, were regularly labeled by the 
Western powers as evidence of Egyptian and Syrian aggression which, it was claimed, 
ultimately took place on behalf of the Kremlin. What resulted was a circle of aggression, 
counter-aggression, and counter-counter-aggression in which the Western powers and 
Syrian counter intelligence traded punches. This sequence of events only ended once Syria 
escaped further destabilization by unification with Egypt in the United Arab Republic. 
Briefly sketching the various plans for a Syrian coup in turn, ‘Operation Straggle’, 
the first coup effort, remains difficult to pin down today due to the sheer number of 
potential coup candidates considered by the Western powers. They included pro-Iraqi 
factions of the SSNP (the scenario preferred by the British); a leader of ‘Syrian moderates’ 
with contacts in the Syrian army (the scenario preferred by the Americans); the restoration 
of Shishakli to power (also considered by the Americans); mobilization of pro-Iraqi tribes 
to allow Iraq a takeover of Syria; and plans to engineer border incidents on the Syrian-
Turkish border in order to facilitate a Turkish military attack on Syria (Saunders 1996: 48-
51; Little 2004: 674-676). All these scenarios failed, however, since the coup date was 
fixed for 29 October 1956. On this very day, Israeli troops started their attack on Egypt 
triggering the Suez Crisis. Thus, plans for the Syrian coup were hastily abandoned. In 
Syrian historiography, these events are termed the ‘Iraqi Coup’, due to the involvement of 
Iraqi-sponsored SSNP members in this first round of failed coup efforts. 
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In the second round, the CIA made efforts to identify politically conservative 
dissidents in the Syrian army in order to have them conduct a US-backed coup. This 
operation, termed ‘Operation Wappen’ in CIA documents and known as the ‘American 
Plot’ in Syrian accounts, appears to have been triggered by the arrival of CIA operative 
Howard Stone in Damascus in June 1957. Yet the plan proved to be another fiasco: the 
CIA-targeted Syrian army members informed Syrian counter-intelligence and, on 12 
August 1957, the US embassy in Damascus was surrounded by the Syrian authorities. This 
resulted in Stone’s arrest and his subsequent ‘confession’ of the plot to the Syrians (Little 
2004: 677).10 There is some evidence to suggest that Shishakli was once again considered 
by the US as a candidate to front a post-coup junta (Blum 2003: 88; Rathmell 1995: 139). 
Yet due to the particularly clumsy nature of the operation, there is consensus in the 
literature that ‘Operation Wappen’ ‘actually strengthened the hand of anti-Western forces’ 
(Little 2004: 677, see also Saunders 1996: 55).  
Between August and October 1957, the crisis in Syria continued to escalate. 
Unwilling to accept failure in their efforts to unseat the Syrian government, British 
embassy staff in Washington and American intelligence operatives, including Kermit 
Roosevelt, reorganized their cooperation by forming a ‘Syria Working Group’. The 
group’s report, put forward on 18 September 1957 and ‘receiving the endorsement of the 
most senior political leaders in the US and British governments’ (Jones 2004: 409), 
converged in a ‘Preferred Plan’ (a term used in the report’s preface) to stir up disturbances 
within Syria followed by border incidents involving Iraq and/or Jordan. This was expected 
to serve as a pretext for Iraqi military action against Syria under the self-defense provision 
of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, combined with efforts to encourage Bedouin 
tribes and Druze elements in the Syrian army to rise up against the Syrian national 
government. The document suggested the setting-up of a Jordan-based ‘Free Syria 
Committee’ and recommended the targeted assassination of some key Syrian army and 
intelligence figures as crucial for the successful conclusion of the operation (Jones 2004: 
405-408). Just as in the case of the two earlier operations, the ‘Preferred Plan’ proved 
infeasible. This was due to a combination of factors such as a lack of support for Western 
                                                
10 There exists disagreement in the literature about the extent of coordination of US and UK coup 
efforts in Syria. Some authors argue that another unilateral American operation, termed ‘Operation 
Wakeful’, took place in the context of ‘Wappen’, while others consider ‘Wakeful’ to constitute an 
independent US operation without the participation of British intelligence (see Prados 2006: 163-164; 
and Pearson 2007: 48).  
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plans within Syria and the short time frame available for coup action before the beginning 
of the rainy season in November. Moreover, Western observers were agreed that Iraqi and 
Jordanian armies ‘did not possess the short-term military capability to overcome anything 
above token Syrian resistance’ (Jones 2004: 406). 
In parallel with the ‘Preferred Plan’, the US also considered backing unilateral 
Turkish moves to engage in a military invasion of Syria. When Turkish troops began a 
military build-up on the Syrian border in mid-September, the US sixth fleet was moved to 
the Syrian coast to provide for additional military back-up. However, this ‘Turkish 
alternative’ (a term suggested by Pearson 2007 to describe what could have been an 
alternative scenario to unseat the Syrian government) suffered from serious shortcomings, 
such as the potential of a Turkish attack to stir up pan-Arab nationalist sentiments in favor 
of Syria. In fact, war between Turkey and Syria would have threatened the IPC pipeline 
that crossed through Syria and would therefore have hurt the economic interests of 
Hashemite Iraq as the leading British client in the region (Pearson 2007: 49-50).  
In the end, neither the ‘Preferred Plan’ nor the ‘Turkish alternative’ took off. 
Instead, the Americans turned back toward diplomacy and pushed the Saudi leadership to 
act as an alternative to Nasser’s version of Arab nationalism. This shift allowed the return 
toward intra-Arab diplomacy. Most importantly, however, a general balance of threats at 
the regional and global level had emerged: Turkey experienced Soviet pressure to stop its 
mobilization drive on the Syrian border while Nasser used this opportunity to land a small 
detachment of Egyptian troops in the Syrian harbor city of Latakia on 13 October. Since 
Nasser’s initiative was in effect backed up by the Soviet Union, a Turkish invasion of Syria 
was by now considered to be too dangerous from the Western point of view (Lesch 1996: 
139).  
Ultimately, the Syrian crisis fizzled out once it became clear that all scenarios to 
push out the Syrian government were doomed to failure. Neither was Saudi Arabia able to 
take over Nasser’s leadership role in the Arab world, nor were the Western allies Iraq, 
Jordan, and Lebanon in a position to take over Syria militarily (Lesch 1996: 140-141; 
Pearson 2007: 54). As soon as Turkey and the Soviet Union mended their fences, the tide 
of events shifted back toward direct diplomatic exchanges between Nasser and the 
Americans. Nasser now announced that he, too, was concerned about rising communist 
influence in Syria. Some degree of consensus arose that the ‘Soviet threat’ in Syria was 
represented by Army Chief Afif al-Bizri and by Khalid al-Azm, a six-time prime minister 
34	
	
of Syria, who was at the time backed as a potential presidential contender by the Syrian 
Communists. Following Nasser’s tactical rapprochement with US interests, the Egyptian 
leader asked his supporters in Syria to form a united front with the Baathists to strengthen 
the political center ground and to guard against further coup attempts from leftist and 
rightist forces. This operation proved a success: the Syrian Baath Party started supporting 
Nasser’s project of union with Egypt as a way to block further advances of the Syrian 
Communists.  
On 12 January 1958, a delegation of Syrian army officers flew to Cairo and the 
United Arab Republic, the union of Egypt and Syria, was declared after brief negotiations 
on 1 February 1958. Thus, unification with Egypt proved the ultimate safeguard to allow 
Syria a degree of protection against external threats, although at the price of becoming part 
of a larger political entity. Yet this political course was only feasible because the Soviet 
Union had already strengthened the Egyptian and Syrian military since 1956 and continued 
to act as the patron of the United Arab Republic after 1958. The Soviet willingness to 
support Nasser despite the latter’s heavy-handed repression against Egyptian and Syrian 
Communists underlined that the Soviet leadership was satisfied to acquire indirect regional 
geopolitical influence rather than to take over and control Arab states directly. 
In the final analysis, the US and UK led 1956-1957 destabilization campaign in 
Syria must be understood as the outcome of earlier Western decisions in favor of weak 
Syrian statehood, which allowed the country only limited degrees of political autonomy. 
The post-independence Syrian civilian and military leaders understood, at least to some 
extent, that Western policymakers were keen to appeal to Syria’s minority communities 
with a history of autonomous decision-making, such as the Druze, and to representatives of 
regions with a history of close links with neighboring countries, such as the Aleppo-based 
People’s Party aligned to Hashemite Iraq, in their efforts to weaken the Syrian central state 
and Syria’s national army. Most of Syria’s political leaders in the late 1940s and early 
1950s were therefore pushed to strengthen Syria’s statehood and independence in order to 
discourage plans of the two neighboring Hashemite countries, Jordan and Iraq, to enforce 
‘Arab unity’ by way of a takeover of Syria. Yet the Western powers never accepted this 
reasoning of Syria’s historical nationalist leadership. Instead, they claimed to be concerned 
about a potential arms race among the Arab states and between the Arabs and Israel. 
Indeed, the latter point served as a pretext to minimize Western support for Syria. 
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However, the Western policy of restraint and ‘evenhandedness’, enshrined in the 
‘Tripartite Declaration’ of 1950 on arms exports to the region between the US, Britain and 
France, was by no means neutral. First, it offered Britain and France a near monopoly of 
supply of military goods to the Arab states and, in the case of France, to Israel – at least as 
long as the US followed their stated objective of avoiding significant arms transfers to the 
region. Second, it ignored extensive US economic assistance to Israel since the early 1950s, 
which made the US from the very beginning the main economic patron of Israel. Third, 
France, with tacit US agreement, allowed Israel access to nuclear secrets which 
subsequently turned the country into the Middle East’s only state with a nuclear arsenal. 
Fourth, the SIPRI arms transfer database for the years 1950 to 1957 (see appendix, pre-
1950 data is not available) underlines that Western and especially French arms deliveries 
to Israel made parallel delivery of weapons to Syria extremely insignificant by comparison. 
Although British arms deliveries to the region were slightly more even-handed, especially 
when factoring in delivery to Iraq and Jordan, the then Arab client states of the UK, it is 
clear that the Syrian army never enjoyed support from any Western power on a scale that 
would have had strategic significance; meanwhile Israel quickly gained the ascendancy.11 
Conversely, the policy of tacit Western boycott of Syria’s military was the main 
reason for the absence of Western networks of influence within the Syrian army. Judged 
with the advantage of hindsight, the revolution in military affairs of the 1950s in the 
Middle East concerned the success or failure of Arab states to acquire the trappings of a 
modern army. At that time, the most significant task was to gain access to an air force 
equipped with jet fighters that were then representing the cutting edge of strategic power. 
If one looks back at the track record of the Syrian military, it is clear that Shishakli was 
keen to deliver these objectives but was kept out in the cold by the US administration while 
receiving only token support from Britain. Yet as soon as Nasser linked up with the Soviet 
Union, Egypt started to receive quick and relevant military assistance from the Kremlin, 
which included access to the most advanced Soviet jet fighters. Due to the Egyptian 
example, it became clear that the Soviet road was the only one available to the Syrian 
                                                
11 As for the interpretation of the relevant SIPRI data (see appendix), one must stress that the Western 
military supplies to Syria during the period, such as the Italian G-55 and G-59 fighter planes, were 
mostly WW2 leftovers and already obsolete in the era of jet fighters. The policy of tacit Western 
boycott of the Syrian military in the late 1940s and early 1950s underlines that the country was 
destined to follow the Lebanese example, where the national army never developed beyond the status 
of a militia and has subsequently been unable to defend the national territory. 
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military in order to gain a regional strategic role. In this context, the quick delivery to Syria 
of MiG-15 and MiG-17 Soviet jet fighters in 1956 and early in 1957 changed the strategic 
calculus in the Middle East and allowed the country to deter a possible invasion from 
neighbors such as British-backed Iraq and US-backed Turkey (Rathmell 1995: 141).  
Once the Soviet deliveries had arrived, western analysts realized that ‘[t]he Soviet 
bloc build-up of Syria does not appear to be a short-term project…. There appears…no 
restriction on what the Syrians can order…. The quantities of aircraft and arms talked of by 
Syria are more than her armed forces can absorb in the immediate future. They are not, 
however, excessive on the assumption that the army and air force are to be completely re-
equipped with Soviet equipment’ (Records of Syria 2005, Vol. 12: 150-151). In summary, 
Syria’s turn to the Soviet Union, in line with the earlier Egyptian example, allowed the 
country to acquire the patronage necessary to become a serious regional power. The 
parallel strengthening of the Syrian military and Syrian state by the Soviet Union since the 
second half of the 1950s had geopolitical significance that continues to influence Middle 
East politics today. 
 
5. The political trajectory of independent Syria between 1946 and 1958: Seven major 
explanatory factors 
When Syria emerged as an independent country from the French Mandate in 1946, it 
immediately acquired an outcast role since it was the only major state in the region that 
was not directly linked to the Western powers by way of patron-client relationships. 
Neighboring Lebanon, the other country in the Levant region without any clear-cut 
external sponsorship, was divided along sectarian lines and never played much of an 
independent role in Arab politics ever since its independence in 1943. For the purpose of 
political analysis, the first cycle of Syria’s statehood between the date of independence on 
17 April 1946 and the time of the country’s unification with Egypt on 8 February 1958 to 
form the United Arab Republic can be divided into three distinct time periods, namely (1) a 
weak formally democratic regime from 1946 to 1949; (2) a period of punctuated 
authoritarian rule between 1949 and 1954; and (3) a return to a weak formally democratic 
regime between 1954 and 1957.  
The first period covers the weak republican democratic government of the 
country’s first President Quwatli. This was followed by the period of the three military 
leaders (Zaim and Hinnawi in 1949 and Shishakli between 1949 and 1950 and from 1951 
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to 1954, respectively). Each of these authoritarian rulers aspired to set up a stable regime, 
yet they all ultimately lacked the domestic and external sources of support that would have 
been necessary in order to achieve their authoritarian goals. While Shishakli was more 
sophisticated than his two colleagues in efforts to gain US endorsement for his rule, none 
of the Syrian candidates ultimately received Western endorsement. Crucially, this rejection 
was by no means due to concern on the part of the Western powers over issues of 
democracy versus dictatorship; rather the Western powers were hesitant to prop up any 
Syrian leadership, whether notionally democratic or not, for fear of weakening regional 
stability in general and the emerging military dominance of Israel in particular.  
At the same time, the Western powers were united in expecting Syrian leaders to 
endorse Western oil pipeline projects such as Aramco’s Trans-Arabian Pipeline and the 
IPC’s Kirkuk-Banias Pipeline, both highly significant for American and British oil 
business, in a timely manner and without too much bargaining on the part of the Syrians. 
They also pushed for Syrian acceptance of the resettlement of Palestinian refugees who 
had been forced from their land due to the creation of the Zionist state. Last but not least, 
the Western powers demanded that Syrian leaders should sign up for regional defense 
alliances against a perceived Soviet threat such as the Middle East Command, Middle East 
Defense Association, and Baghdad Pact, respectively. In this context, the Western powers 
claimed to fear the emergence of a geopolitical ‘vacuum’ in Syria, which was in turn 
blamed on the country’s ‘ultranationalism’ (a term initially coined by British diplomats to 
describe Quwatli’s presidency). Ultimately, the Western powers feared that the alliance 
between Nasser and the Soviets would challenge American and British regional dominance 
in the Middle East.  
What the Western leaders were unwilling to recognize, however, was that Syria’s 
outcast status and the resulting ‘vacuum’ were very much of their own making. If the 
United States had been willing to offer military and economic assistance, the country 
would certainly have been in a strong position to establish privileged relationships with 
Syria. This was certainly true for the duration of Shishakli’s rule and probably would have 
also applied for other windows of opportunity to engage Syria, such as in the time period 
directly after the Franco-British and Israeli attack on Nasser’s Egypt in 1956, when the 
American rejection of Franco-British ‘colonialism’ allowed for a rapprochement between 
the US and some Arab nationalist leaders.  
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However, Syrian leaders’ initial openness to US assistance in their state building 
efforts was ultimately abandoned because of the Anglo-American destabilization efforts of 
1956 and 1957. By this time, the Syrian governments of the day felt that the repeated coup 
efforts of Anglo-American operators were evidence for the Western powers’ interest to 
rule Syria by dictate. In fact, the three covert actions for Western takeover of Syria, namely 
the joint British-American coup plan ‘Operation Straggle’ of 1956; the ‘Turkish plot’ of 
1957; and the ‘Operation Wappen’, also known as the ‘American Plot’ in Syrian 
historiography (Rathmell 1995: 136-143; Kahana and Suwaed 2009: 246-248), all 
underlined that Western geopolitical interests did not allow for any significant degree of 
Syrian autonomy. After each of these failed operations, the Western powers in general and 
the US in particular lost more of what had remained of their influence within Syria.  
In summary, several factors explain why Syria was first pushed toward Nasser’s 
Egypt and then toward long-term geopolitical alignment with the Soviet Union: four global, 
one regional Arab, and two domestic Syrian factors explicate the country’s outcast role in 
the region when looked at from the point of view of the US and the other Western powers.  
The four global factors were as follows: (1) lack of policy coordination of the three 
relevant Western powers, i.e. the US, Britain, and France toward Syria; (2) unwillingness 
on the part of the Western powers to accept Arab (and Syrian) nationalism as a genuine 
third force in the early Cold War era and failure to offer relevant military and economic 
assistance; (3) backlash within Syria against US and British covert action in 1956 and 1957 
that failed to unseat Syria’s leadership and destroyed what had remained of Western 
influence among the Syrian elite; and (4) countervailing willingness of the Soviet Union to 
pursue limited objectives in the Middle East which offered Syrian political leaders an 
attractive alternative to Western patronage.  
Firstly, the three Western states failed to effectively coordinate their regional and 
Syria policies. France was initially very reluctant to leave Syria and applied military force 
in efforts to extract economic and military concessions from Syria’s nationalist leadership 
in 1945 and 1946. However, Syrian resistance and an informal Anglo-American alliance 
jointly removed France as a stakeholder in the Levant. In the early 1950s, France 
reappeared in the area as the principal military supplier of Israel; yet this move made it 
impossible for France to regain substantial influence with any of the Middle Eastern Arab 
states (Mott 2002: 177). Britain as the second European power in the region principally 
aimed to defend the status quo and focused on efforts to sustain privileged relationships 
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with its Hashemite clients in Jordan and Iraq. In 1952, UK policymakers seriously 
considered adding Syria to the fold. Yet, most senior Syrian policymakers continued to 
reject closer links with the neighboring Hashemite countries since they considered them to 
constitute the principal danger to Syria’s statehood and independence. The same Syrian 
policymakers also declined to join the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact in 1955 and, after 
the 1956 Suez disaster, Britain lost the ability to exercise independent regional leadership 
(Walt 1987: 59).  
By contrast, the sometime US posture as a principled opponent of European 
colonialism in the Middle East was due to the country’s lack of interest in burdening itself 
with the fate of the two declining European powers. At this time, the US did not require 
Middle Eastern oil supplies while Britain and other Western European countries needed 
them in order to facilitate the economic recovery of Western Europe. Thus, US 
policymakers consciously refused to offer substantial military assistance to any of the Arab 
countries and US Defense Secretary Lovett summed up his country’s position in 1952 
stating that the Arabs should only receive ‘[l]imited quantities of non-competitive 
(obsolete) items of military equipment’ (Foreign Relations of the United States, 6 
September 1952: 2335). Overall, the Americans did not rush to formally take over British 
positions; they could be confident that the laws of political gravity would allow them to 
soon replace what remained of British regional influence. In this context, the British failure 
to install political and military alliances in the early to mid-1950s to reorganize the Arab 
region as part of a Cold War front against the Soviet Union, most notably the Baghdad 
Pact, did not concern the US too much. After all, American power could also be exercised 
in direct bilateral relationships with the Arab states, Turkey, and Israel.  
The second factor explaining the failure of the Western powers to establish a strong 
position in Syria was their collective rejection to engage with Arab (and Syrian) 
nationalism. In this context, Nasser’s policy of ‘positive neutrality’ of Egypt in the Cold 
War – i.e. the unwillingness of Nasser to take sides in the global geopolitical confrontation 
between the US and the Soviet Union – was misunderstood as a smoke screen for 
communist subversion or even a communist takeover by proxy. The US failed to 
understand Nasser’s skillful use of the Cold War context, soon to be copied by the Syrians, 
to extract economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union while avoiding any 
alliance with local communist forces. As for Syria, Britain was unable to act due to its 
preexisting regional alliances with Jordan and Iraq.  
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The US, too, failed to fill the gap and did not make any genuine offers to any of the 
Syrian leaders in the early 1950s. This was made clear in a crucial personal exchange 
between US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and Syria’s ruler General Shishakli that 
occurred in the American Embassy in Damascus on 16 May 1953. When Shishakli used 
the opportunity to make his case for US military assistance to build up the Syrian army, 
Dulles first voiced concern for Israel’s security and then fell back on technicalities in order 
to avoid any direct engagement with the issue at hand. In this context, Shishakli made the 
reasonable point that ‘it would not be wise to get involved in a “vicious circle” where Syria 
cannot receive United States aid until it gives a specific undertaking or engagement, while 
on the other hand Syria cannot give an undertaking or engagement until it is assured of a 
program which meets its requirements’ (Foreign Relations of the United States, 16 May 
1953: 64; see also Saunders 1996: 23-25). By way of reply, ‘Mr. Stassen [Director of the 
US Mutual Security Agency] said he believed this could be made by a step-by-step 
approach to the problem. General Shishakli said that the problem was really to find a point 
in the circle from which to start’ (Foreign Relations of the United States, 16 May 1953: 64, 
emphasis added). Of course the right point in the circle was never found. 
The third factor explaining the Western powers’ failure in Syria was the short-
termism of Britain and the US in their dealings with the Syrian leaders. Both powers failed 
to establish strong networks of influence and the various Western coup attempts in Syria 
between 1956 and 1957 had the unintended consequence of increasing the influence of the 
Nasserist and Baathist forces in the Syrian army at the expense of potentially pro-Western 
conservative elements. In fact, even conservative Syrian nationalist leaders were now keen 
to distance themselves from the Western powers. President Quwatli, for example, went so 
far to label the US an ‘overt foe’ in July 1957, which made the US Chargé d’Affaires issue 
the countercharge that his speech was ‘indistinguishable from Communist propaganda’ 
(cited in Rathmell 1995: 136). Thus, the Western powers had hardly any friends left in 
Syria in the second half of the 1950s. 
The fourth factor explaining Western failure in Syria in the 1950s was the 
countervailing role of the Soviet Union. From the Soviet perspective, the Middle East was 
a new geopolitical region to enter and Soviet policy was not informed by the long track 
record of imperial rule in the manner in which British and French regional expertise 
trickled down to US policymakers. Thus, the Soviet Union pursued limited objectives in 
comparison to the US, namely to acquire a power stake in the Middle East by way of 
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privileged relations with friendly regimes, rather than a communist takeover that was never 
a realistic objective for the Egyptian and Syrian CP’s and would have inevitably resulted in 
direct confrontation with the US. Moreover, Soviet strategists knew that the previous 
unwillingness of the Western powers to construct patron-client relationships with Egyptian 
and Syrian leaders had opened the door for them. For example, the six-time Syrian Prime 
Minister Khalid al-Azm praised the Soviets in 1957 stating that ‘[t]he U.S.S.R. has given 
us political support and supplied us with arms, which we were completely unable to obtain 
from countries other than the U.S.S.R.’ (al-Azm, quoted in Ro’i 1973: 232).  
Between 1955 and 1957, the Syrian army quickly acquired a serious air force based 
on large numbers of advanced Soviet MiG jet fighters (see SIPRI data in the Appendix 
below). This dispatch of Soviet military assistance immediately strengthened Syria’s 
regional standing and, together with explicit Soviet warnings to Turkey, helped to deter 
Turkey from a potential military attack on Syria in 1957 (Lesch 1996: 137-139). Once 
committed, the Soviets were willing to build up the client armies of Egypt and Syria in a 
sustained manner, which, in turn, allowed the military to become the dominant actor in 
domestic politics. In this sense, the Soviet Union’s intervention in the Middle East in the 
1950s had a lasting impact on the behavior of all other states in the region. 
In addition to the four global factors, one regional Arab and two domestic Syrian 
factors also explain the trajectory of the Syrian state between 1946 and 1958.  
At the regional level, the emergence of at least notionally independent Arab states 
after WW2 produced a new balance of power in the Levant and on the Arab peninsula. 
Two sets of states contested for regional hegemony: an alliance made up of Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia faced another camp consisting of the two Hashemite Kingdoms in Jordan and 
Iraq. In this intra-Arab leadership contest, Syria quickly became the main site of 
contestation. Thus, the Sykes-Picot borderlines, imposed by Britain and France in order to 
divide and rule the Arabs, did serve their function as judged from the point of view of the 
Western powers. Syria emerged as a swing state in this regional balance; yet all efforts by 
outsiders to make Syria join either of the two camps ultimately failed. This was due to the 
fact that ‘Arab unity’ along ‘Greater Syria’ or ‘Fertile Crescent’ lines (i.e. unification with 
Hashemite Jordan or Hashemite Iraq, respectively) was never accepted by a decisive 
majority of Syrians. Rather, the highly mixed ethnic and sectarian composition of Syria 
forced domestic policymakers to first and foremost stabilize their own state. In this effort, 
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they looked for support from those Arab states that were least likely to demand the 
takeover of their country by way of ‘unity’.  
This explains why Syria’s post-independence leaders were keen to receive Egyptian 
and Saudi support, were fairly open for US assistance at various times in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, and were generally critical of Hashemite and British power since they were 
considered to be the main danger to Syria’s independence. The two Hashemite states, in 
turn, certainly tried to gain influence within Syria too. Yet the project of unifying Syria 
with Iraq that was advanced by the Aleppo-based People’s Party and briefly became 
official Syrian government policy during Hinnawi’s rule in 1949 – or indeed any other 
unity project – would certainly have produced new internal divisions. Moreover, the 
Western powers also rejected Arab unity projects and British policymakers genuinely 
preferred Arab regional stability compared to the expansion of power of their Hashemite 
clients by way of a takeover of Syria. After the Suez disaster in 1956, British policymakers 
reconsidered the Syrian issue but such efforts came too late in the day. The same applied to 
US efforts to push the Saudi King as an alternative regional leader against Nasser and for 
parallel attempts to bring back General Shishakli as figurehead of a pro-American regime 
in Syria during one of the 1957 coup attempts. In summary, British and American regional 
policymakers failed to use the windows of opportunity that had been available in Syria 
before 1956 and that were no longer available once the Soviet Union entered the Middle 
East as a competing power. 
Finally, two domestic Syrian factors must also be considered to explain Syria’s 
trajectory between 1946 and 1958.  
First, one must take account of the extraordinary weakness of the postcolonial 
Syrian state, which was characterized by domestic conflict between different ethnic and 
sectarian groups, weak central authority, and a weak political class consisting of 
representatives of the landed aristocracy unable to accommodate to modern mass politics. 
In order to retain power in a difficult environment, Syria’s first President Quwatli relied on 
regional alliances with Egypt and Saudi Arabia to support him against his Hashemite 
adversaries. However, these alliances were never endorsed and backed up by British and 
American policymakers. While Quwatli’s conservative political views might have marked 
him out for Western support under a different set of circumstances, they ultimately failed 
to protect his presidency because he insisted on his own autonomy and business interests. 
In the eyes of US and UK policymakers, Quwatli’s behavior showed the latter’s 
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unwillingness to enter into a patron-client relationship. This made his presidency 
vulnerable and he was easily forced out by Zaim’s 1949 army coup. 
The second domestic factor concerned the issue of army power in the context of a 
weak state. Between 1949 and 1954, three military officers (Zaim, Hinnawi, and Shishakli, 
respectively) pursued efforts to replace the civilian institutions and to become ‘strong men’ 
backed up by the military. They all hoped to turn the strong domestic position of the army 
into a launch pad to stabilize Syrian statehood. Yet two of the three contenders for the 
position of authoritarian leader were very weak personalities. In particular, Zaim’s 
understanding of politics was limited and his impulsive attempts to monopolize power 
turned him into a source of ridicule in the eyes of his fellow officers. When Hinnawi 
subsequently replaced Zaim, he was little more than a coincidental figure gaining power 
without a program. His only significant initiative was to advocate for Syria’s unity with 
Iraq (‘Fertile Crescent’); yet this proposal directly triggered his own downfall and his short 
period at the top of Syrian politics did not influence subsequent events.  
By comparison, the third contender for power, Shishakli, was a much more serious 
figure who tried to bargain with the UK and US in a sophisticated manner courting their 
endorsement and patronage. The main objective of Shishakli was to receive Western 
military and economic assistance in order to stabilize the Syrian state. In the context of the 
early 1950s, this concerned in particular the creation of a credible air force as a new branch 
of the Syrian army in line with similar efforts in neighboring Arab countries and in Israel. 
However, the Western powers’ rejection to consider delivery of relevant military assets 
underlined that Shishakli was not considered valuable enough to deserve endorsement 
from outside. In fact, Shishakli simply could not offer one-sided accommodation of 
Western objectives, such as the agreement to permanently settle Palestinian refugees in 
Syria, without receiving anything in return in terms of Western pressure on Israel to follow 
the relevant UN resolutions that would have addressed some of the Arabs’ legitimate 
grievances. This limit in Shishakli’s willingness to please Western interests was driven by 
well-founded concerns over his own standing in Syrian domestic politics. His power base 
was ultimately not strong enough to impose policies that would have offended the 
mainstream Arab nationalist opinion of the time. Thus, when US policymakers pointedly 
refused to take the first step in providing military supplies for Syria, Shishakli had nowhere 
else to go. He subsequently suffered the same fate as his civilian and military predecessors 
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in the role of Syrian state leader: his own domestic support base crumbled and his regime 
suffered breakdown. 
 
Conclusion  
In summary, all civilian and military efforts to stabilize the Syrian state after independence 
in 1946 failed due to a combination of the Cold War conflict, intra-Arab contests over 
regional hegemony, and Syrian domestic conflicts. These different levels of instability 
jointly weakened the ability of all domestic Syrian regimes between 1946 and 1958 to 
acquire substantial resources in the military and economic fields to back up the country’s 
independence. As a weak state, Syria became the object of foreign interference, while 
domestic actors lacked the capability to strengthen the system from within. This changed, 
however, when Egypt emerged as the center of independent Arab political strength under 
Nasser’s leadership. The emerging strategic alliance between Nasser and the Soviet Union 
was soon extended to Syria, and the country was able to leave behind some of the chronic 
instability that had characterized the period between 1946 and 1958.  
 Yet the ‘cure’ for the weaknesses of the Syrian state served only to prepare the ground 
for new powerful challenges, just as it had in the case of Egypt. Increasing the strength and 
political influence of the military resulted in structural domination of the state by the 
military – with lasting repercussions for the politics of Egypt and Syria that have continued 
to the present. Syria’s relative isolation in the region once again became apparent when US 
policymakers managed to regain control of Egypt’s leadership in the mid-1970s during 
Anwar Sadat’s rule, thereby breaking the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel in 
favor of Syria’s main opponent. Thus, the geopolitical accident of Syria’s emergence as an 
independent but weak country, lacking stable geopolitical patronage and aligning itself 
with the weaker of the two superpowers for lack of any viable alternative, set the scene for 
the existential challenges forced upon the Syrian people today. In this context, it is timely 
to be aware that Western destabilization of Syria started well before the Baath regime even 
existed. 
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